Poythress’s Trinitarian Logic: A Review Essay by Jongsma, Calvin
Volume 42 Number 4 Article 2 
June 2014 
Poythress’s Trinitarian Logic: A Review Essay 
Calvin Jongsma 
Dordt College, calvin.jongsma@dordt.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege 
 Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Higher Education Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jongsma, Calvin (2014) "Poythress’s Trinitarian Logic: A Review Essay," 
Pro Rege: Vol. 42: No. 4, 6 - 15. 
Available at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege/vol42/iss4/2 
This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Publications at Digital Collections @ 
Dordt. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pro Rege by an authorized administrator of Digital Collections @ Dordt. 
For more information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu. 
6     Pro Rege—June 2014
Poythress, Vern Sheridan. Logic: A God-Centered Ap-
proach to the Foundation of Western Thought. Cross-
way, 2013. 733 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4335-3229-0 
In the “quick-summary” from an online video 
taken at a Westminster Seminary dessert social 
held a year ago to celebrate this book’s publication, 
Vern Poythress claims, “This is a Christian ap-
proach to logic. It challenges everything in West-
ern civilization from Aristotle onward. I believe 
that logic is rooted in the Trinitarian character of 
God, and nobody, virtually, has said that.” Again, 
in words from early in the book itself, the author 
asserts, “This foundation … in logic [for] the 
whole of Western thought has to be redone.” Pro-
viding a genuinely alternative Christian approach 
to the logical basis of Western thought seems an 
outrageously grand goal, but one that is worth ex-
amining in an essay review. Unfortunately, while 
Poythress almost predictably promises more than 
he delivers, I believe he also delivers more than he 
should have promised.
One expects from the title of the book and the 
blurb on the back cover that this work could be an 
ideal (though massive) textbook for the beginning 
study of logic at a Christian college or seminary, 
so I will review it largely from that vantage point. 
As I do for any such text, I will examine its ap-
proach, analyze its main components and ideas, 
and see how these things are developed. After be-
ginning with a few practical matters, I will focus 
extensively on several substantive technical issues. 
I will conclude by reviewing the theological matrix 
in which the logic is embedded.
Educational Considerations
Logic does indeed treat topics typically appearing 
in an introductory logic textbook: Aristotelian syl-
logistic logic (AL), propositional logic (PL), and 
first-order predicate logic (FOL), among other 
things. And it places the study of logic within a 
broader Christian context. But, having taught in-
troductory logic at Dordt College for over three 
decades in both philosophy and mathematics 
classes, I would not choose this as my textbook, 
for a number of reasons.
From a practical point of view, Logic lacks a 
sufficient supply and range of exercises to be con-
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sidered a self-contained textbook. Each section 
concludes with questions “For Further Reflection,” 
but these are rather limited, and not enough of 
them help students consolidate their understand-
ing of the material. Moreover, the book is orga-
nized into 68 chapters and 22 appendices of vary-
ing lengths, with little pedagogical guidance for 
how the various sections might be combined into 
appropriate-sized lessons and units to be taught 
and studied in a more formal educational setting. 
It is even unclear how central some of the topics 
might be; for instance, the Preface and the Part 
headings make it seem as if PL and FOL might 
not be all that necessary for learning elementary 
logic. And, since the author is so intent on pro-
viding A God-Centered Approach to the Foundation 
of Western Thought, Trinitarian theology gets pride 
of place. The more systematic technical material 
(logic proper) doesn’t begin until 192 pages into 
the book, and even then, it is often eclipsed by 
theological reflections. Furthermore, as I will doc-
ument below, there are a number of significant de-
ficiencies in Poythress’s exposition of logic’s main 
ideas and systems. At best, I would consider using 
this book as supplementary reading on the theo-
logical perspective it espouses. For that purpose, 
you can’t beat the price, for the author has posted 
the entire text on his website as a searchable PDF 
to be freely downloaded.
In addition to elementary classical logic, 
Poythress touches on a wide range of topics not 
ordinarily included in a first course in logic: Bool-
ean algebra, lattice theory, the formal axiomatiza-
tion of logic and mathematics, set theory and Rus-
sell’s Paradox, the theory of computability, Gödel’s 
Completeness and Incompleteness Theorems, 
model theory, intuitionistic logic, and modal 
logic. These are mostly treated summarily in the 
supplementary appendices, though a number of 
them appear in the later chapters as enrichment 
topics. While these areas are of interest to modern 
logicians, I doubt that many will connect well with 
the typical reader beginning to learn basic logic. 
Their inclusion may reveal more about the au-
thor’s graduate training in abstract algebra (under 
Garrett Birkhoff) and mathematical logic (under 
Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke) than about any 
pressing need to include them in an introductory 
survey of logic. 
Logical Content and Methodology
As indicated, Poythress’s academic pedigree is im-
peccable. A Putnam fellow in 1964, he received his 
Ph.D. in mathematics from Harvard University in 
1970. Poythress is obviously familiar with the logic 
and the mathematical foundations he discusses. 
Nevertheless, these credentials don’t guarantee that 
he presents his material on logic in the most fitting 
or up-to-date manner; nor does it keep him from 
making some major mistakes.
Let me begin with a small but irritating stylistic 
preference. Poythress notes in defining a concept, 
such as the truth-functional connective or ( 235), 
that he will use the conditional only if instead of 
the fuller and more accurate biconditional if and 
only if (hereafter, iff) because he finds the former 
more natural/less pedantic. In my experience, he 
is in a tiny minority on this; mathematicians (and 
occasionally Poythress himself ) tend instead to use 
the oppositely directed if as an informal substitute 
where iff is called for. They do so because uniniti-
ated students find the meaning of only if confus-
ing; in fact, it seems to have tripped Poythress up. 
After saying that the compound sentence p or q is 
false only if both sentences p and q are false (i.e., 
if p or q is false, then both p and q are false), he 
completes his truth-functional definition of p or q 
by saying that otherwise it is true (i.e., if it is not 
the case that both p and q are false, then p or q 
is true—the logically redundant contrapositive of 
the clause he just asserted), which, taken strictly, 
still leaves open the truth value of p or q when both 
are false—that could be true without violating the 
definition.
More important problems surface in how 
Unfortunately, while Poythress 
almost predictably promises 
more than he delivers, I believe 
he also delivers more than he 
should have promised.
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Poythress perceives the central goals of logic and 
how he subsequently tries to achieve them in de-
veloping the three main systems of formal logic. 
Poythress never gives his reader a succinct defini-
tion of logic, though he formulates some state-
ments by others that he seems to accept: logic 
aims to codify the basic forms of valid reasoning 
and to point out some common fallacious/coun-
terfeit forms so that a knowledgeable practitioner 
can properly analyze and evaluate arguments. In 
accord with this view, Poythress notes that logic 
is largely and rightly unconcerned with the truth 
and specific meaning of the statements involved 
in an argument (material irrelevance), focusing 
only on whether the premises logically imply the 
conclusion—though he, like some, may want to 
place logic within the larger context of seeking and 
communicating the truth about whatever is being 
investigated. 
I am not unhappy with emphasizing valid ar-
gumentation and logical implication as central 
to logic, but Poythress adheres to this viewpoint 
rather unevenly, and this emphasis fails to cover 
two other key concerns of logic. In opposition to 
this goal of validity, but only superficially so, logic 
is also intensely interested in the notions of truth 
and logical truth, since they are tied to a criterion 
for validity and can be used in a certain sense to ar-
ticulate some basic laws of logic. Strangely enough, 
as we will see, although Poythress doesn’t identify 
truth at the outset as a central concern of logic, 
this becomes almost his sole interest when he turns 
to consider PL and FOL.
A third main aim of any system of logic is to 
provide an adequate inferential basis for construct-
ing conclusive arguments. This aim requires one to 
choose and use a set of inference rules for making 
deductions. Concentrating only on logical impli-
cation is insufficient; derivations or proofs provide 
a level of logical discourse that goes beyond valid 
argument forms. Poythress does present a number 
of deductions in the book, but too few of these il-
lustrate how rigorous derivations can be construct-
ed using rules of inference, and so opportunities 
are lost for showing students the value of what is 
being studied. Deductions of conclusions from 
premise sets ought to be presented for each system 
of logic on the basis of an appropriate inferential 
infra-structure that validates their construction, 
but these are largely missing.
Once a logic’s system of inference rules for de-
ducing conclusions is stipulated, one can also in-
vestigate two meta-logical properties tied to this: 
whether the system of logic is deductively sound 
(whatever can be deduced from a premise set using 
the inference rules is logically implied by the premises) 
and whether it is deductively complete (whatever is 
logically implied by a set of premises can be deduced 
from them via the inference rules). Poythress does 
explore some of these properties in his treatment 
of PL and FOL, but he does so in a rather narrow 
way, as we will note further below.
Before discussing those modern systems, how-
ever, let’s look briefly at how Poythress presents AL. 
Since traditional syllogistic logic was the reigning 
system of logic for almost 2200 years following 
its inception in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (c. 330 
BC), students should get to know a version of this 
system if they want to understand what Western 
thinkers long considered deductive reasoning to 
be, whether they accepted it as foundational (e.g., 
Aquinas) or challenged it as useless (e.g., Bacon 
and Locke). Poythress does discuss the various 
forms of syllogistic inference, but he focuses main-
ly on the four most basic first-figure moods—
Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio (Chapters 26 
- 29)—relegating the other 20 valid moods to the 
appendices (A2 and A3). 
In addition to establishing the validity of the 
basic forms via Venn Diagrams, Poythress explores 
their logical interrelationships by deducing them 
one from another (Chapter 28). In order to do 
this, he must make use of some (unidentified) im-
mediate inference rules (Obversion rules as well as a 
Double Negative rule), which he treats as pertaining 
to sentence retranslation rather than to the deduc-
tion process per se. Furthermore, in comparing the 
syllogistic form Darii with its stronger counterpart 
Barbara, he acts as if the former is a special instance 
of the latter and should therefore be accepted; but 
of course this conclusion doesn’t follow. The con-
clusion of Darii can, in fact, be deduced from its 
premises using Barbara as an inference rule, but 
in addition, a number of other rules and proof 
strategies must be employed (Reductio ad Absur-
dum [RAA] along with Obversion and Conversion; 
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Given the understanding that 
a major (even if not the sole) 
goal of logic is to study valid 
argumentation, an introductory 
text ought to clearly explain 
when a set of premises logically 
implies its conclusion, or, to 
put it in other words, when 
a conclusion logically follows 
from or is a logical consequence 
of its premises.
else RAA along with the second-figure form Cam-
estres suffices, without Barbara). Poythress later 
(Appendix A2) shows conversely that Barbara can 
be derived from Darii, but he again uses RAA and 
some immediate inference rules, still treating the 
latter as relevant to rephrasing statements instead 
of inferring with them. His deductions thus form a 
patchwork of sentence inter-translations, proof by 
contradiction (without setting out the traditional 
Square of Opposition), and syllogistic conclusions.
Syllogistic logic is a wonderful first system to 
explore with students because, in addition to its 
historical significance, it relates well to everyday 
kinds of argumentation. Also, it can be used to 
nicely and simply illustrate the main concerns con-
nected to any formal system of logic: validity (as-
sessed by Venn Diagrams and counterarguments), 
derivations (using some system of inference rules), 
soundness, and completeness. Poythress considers 
only validity for AL and ignores the other mat-
ters: he rarely presents an argument that goes be-
yond a simple syllogistic form, and the fact that he 
never identifies a basic set of inference rules to be 
used for constructing deductions means he is un-
able even to entertain the potential soundness and 
completeness of AL.
When Poythress begins systematically to study 
PL and FOL in Chapters 39 and 50, he seems to 
forget his earlier circumscription of the purposes 
of logic (valid arguments, logical implication). 
Now his aim seems instead to be to identify and 
derive all logical truths or tautologies, statements 
like the Law of Excluded Middle, “p or not-p,” 
which are always true, under any interpretation of 
the sentence p. Truth tables naturally provide an 
effective means for showing this for PL, but, evi-
dently following Whitehead and Russell in Prin-
cipia Mathematica, Poythress chooses to treat PL 
primarily as an axiomatic system of tautologies. To 
derive complex logical truths from a chosen set of 
axioms, one must use just two rules of inference, 
Modus Ponens and Substitution. The first rule is 
crucial for constructing all sorts of garden-variety 
arguments, but it functions primarily here in the 
restrictive context of deriving tautologies from 
tautologies. Such derivations can be extremely ar-
tificial, long, and complicated, even for rather sim-
ple results. Poythress thus expands his list of infer-
ence rules to a more natural collection, originally 
proposed to capture the ways we typically reason 
in mathematics and elsewhere, but he continues 
to use them as a means for deriving logical truths 
as theorems. This is far too narrow a focus for an 
introductory logic course. Students (along with 
mathematicians) aren’t really interested in proving 
logical truths from axioms; they want to use infer-
ence rules to deduce conclusions from premises, 
none of which are typically logical truths. More-
over, operating within Poythress’s constrictive 
view of deduction, one finds that the properties of 
soundness and completeness are likewise limited 
to claims about logical truths.
Given the understanding that a major (even if 
not the sole) goal of logic is to study valid argu-
mentation, an introductory text ought to clearly 
explain when a set of premises logically implies its 
conclusion, or, to put it in other words, when a 
conclusion logically follows from or is a logical con-
sequence of its premises. This is something that 
can and should be discussed first in general terms, 
proposing broad intuitive criteria, but it should 
also be specialized for each system of logic under 
consideration. Logic is inadequate on both counts. 
Two common criteria for testing logical implica-
tion make use of the notions of truth-values un-
der all interpretations (a conclusion logically follows 
from a set of premises iff it must be true whenever the 
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premises are) and information content (a conclusion 
logically follows from a set of premises iff the informa-
tion contained in the conclusion is already contained 
in/doesn’t go beyond the premises). Poythress never 
highlights these (or any other) principles as crite-
ria for deciding whether a conclusion is a logical 
consequence of a set of premises, though they lie 
behind how one evaluates arguments as valid or 
invalid for all the systems of logic. For instance, 
the information-content criterion justifies the use 
of Venn Diagrams to represent and test syllogistic 
reasoning, but this background is never explicitly 
spelled out. Instead Poythress appeals to the theo-
logical doctrine that “the persons of the Trinity 
indwell one another” (203), a truth that he claims 
provides an “uncreated foundation for [the] spatial 
relations” exhibited by these diagrams. Similarly, 
the above truth-value criterion (with its side-kick, 
counter-arguments) provides the necessary foun-
dation for evaluating valid arguments in PL and 
FOL, but Poythress doesn’t explore this criterion 
much for either system, presumably because his 
strong interest in logical truth leaves little room 
for other concerns.
A reader of Poythress’s Logic may feel I’m be-
ing unfair in claiming that PL lacks a proper focus 
on validity and implication. After all, doesn’t the 
text analyze logical implication and logical equiva-
lence in some detail when it introduces the if-then 
and the iff connectives? Sadly, no. What Poythress 
does instead by presenting these PL connectives as 
formally capturing the meaning of logical implica-
tion and logical equivalence is to perpetrate a seri-
ous error that an elementary logic text ought to 
forestall and oppose, not propagate. Poythress may 
be following Whitehead and Russell here, too, for 
their early twentieth-century work is a historically 
important source for this regrettable equivocation.
As Poythress correctly notes early on, whether 
a conclusion logically follows from a premise set 
doesn’t depend on the actual truth values of the 
statements; it depends upon the interrelationship 
of their logical forms. On the other hand, whether 
a conditional statement is true completely depends 
upon the truth values of the sentences involved. 
That alone should alert one to the fact that logical 
implication cannot be encapsulated by the con-
ditional PL-form if p then q (nor logical equiva-
lence by the form p iff q), not even if you factor 
in some sort of fuzzy idealization process. The real 
connection is actually captured by an important 
meta-logical result that can be used to motivate or 
justify the peculiar conventional truth-functional 
definition given for the conditional connective 
if-then (if p then q is true just in case q is true or 
p is false). This result is a semantic version of the 
Herbrand-Tarski Deduction Theorem: a premise 
p logically implies its conclusion q iff the associated 
conditional if p then q is logically true. Poythress 
nowhere alerts his reader to this important linkage. 
He instead obscures the connection by glibly read-
ing the conditional sentence if p then q as assert-
ing p implies q, thereby reinforcing the confusion 
instead of dispelling it. Naturally there are times 
when Poythress mentions logical implication and 
logical equivalence when that really is what he 
wants, but his identification of these semantic rela-
tions with logical operators within PL is a category 
mistake. Collapsing a meta-logical semantic claim 
into a particular syntactically formed statement 
inside PL is analogous to identifying the relation 
of divisibility in number theory with the operation 
of division.
Logical implication is relevant, of course, for 
much more than single-premise arguments in PL 
(something Poythress fails to emphasize), but in 
the context of that system of logic, full-fledged 
implication is best explicated by means of an ex-
tended truth table, showing that whenever a valid 
argument’s premises are jointly true, so is its con-
clusion. No such table for or analysis of a valid ar-
gument is to be found in Logic. Poythress chooses 
instead to derive a conclusion from its premises by 
means of a deduction, but then only for statements 
that are tautologies proved from the system’s axi-
oms. Using an extended truth table in this context, 
where all statements are logical truths, would be 
rather silly; the conclusion is always true, whatever 
the truth value of the premises—nothing really 
needs to be checked except the truth value of the 
conclusion.
There are other difficulties with Poythress’s 
technical development of logic, but I will note 
only one more—his treatment of completeness. 
Logic has several notions of completeness, and the 
terminology for naming them has not been fully 
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standardized. Poythress takes up a couple of these, 
which I will call deductive completeness and theory 
completeness. Deductive completeness, defined 
above, is a system-dependent property of the logic 
under consideration: a formal system of logic is de-
ductively complete iff whatever is logically implied by 
a set of premises can be deduced from them using the 
inference rules chosen for the system. Well-designed 
variants of both PL and FOL are deductively com-
plete, an important result first proved by Gödel 
in 1929. Theory completeness, on the other hand, 
is a property of a theory rather than of the logic 
involved in developing it: in semantic terms, a set 
of axioms is theory complete iff its logical consequenc-
es form a maximally consistent set; i.e., iff for any 
proposition formulated in the language of the theory, 
either it or its negation (but not both) logically follows 
from the axioms. Since Poythress insists on develop-
ing modern logic in the style of Whitehead and 
Russell, as an axiomatic system, he has the possi-
bility of examining PL and FOL from both points 
of view, but he fails to do either satisfactorily. Nat-
urally, these systems of logic (as theories) are not 
theory complete. Logical statement forms include 
more than logical truths and contradictions: it is 
not the case for a primitive sentence P that either it 
or its negation not-P must be a tautology. In con-
trast, however, these systems of logic (as logic) are 
deductively complete; but here Poythress must be 
content with what we might call weak deductive 
completeness: whatever logical truth follows from 
the stipulated axiomatic basis (all such truths, of 
course) can be derived from the axioms. Whether 
this result can be parlayed into the stronger, more 
interesting and desirable claim about the logical 
consequences of any premise set being derivable is 
never discussed. Logic is de facto about truth, it 
seems, not validity.
After noting that PL and FOL are (weakly) de-
ductively complete, Poythress proceeds to explore 
whether mathematics is complete. Here he also ap-
peals to Gödel, this time to his two Incompleteness 
Theorems (1931). Unfortunately for the unsuspect-
ing novice, Poythress has subtly shifted to a second 
meaning of completeness, which he never defines, 
treating the new idea almost as if it were the same 
as or an extension of the former. He notes loosely 
that “any ordinary set of axioms for arithmetic is 
incomplete in the logical sense” (424), and he later 
equates an axiom system being complete with the 
possibility of deriving true results from the axioms 
(451), which in the absence of any further distinc-
tion is reminiscent of deductive completeness. Ac-
tually, what Gödel proved in his first theorem (re-
fined by Rosser in 1936) was that if arithmetic is 
logically consistent, then it is not theory complete: 
one can generate sentences in the language of 
arithmetic that cannot be proved or disproved. But 
this does not mean, as one might falsely conclude, 
that there are arithmetic statements (FOL-) im-
plied by the axioms that cannot be (FOL-) proved 
from them—FOL remains deductively complete 
when used for arithmetic as well as for any other 
theory. One can naturally claim, as Poythress does, 
that there are unprovable true arithmetical state-
ments, but then one must tacitly take the notion 
of being arithmetically true in an absolute system-
independent or extra-systemic sense while keeping 
the notion of provability restricted to the formal 
system of logic being employed. Regardless, the 
conceptual divergence between truth and proof 
shouldn’t be articulated in a way that makes one 
think in vague terms that arithmetic is incomplete 
while logic is not: axiomatic logic is also (trivially) 
theory incomplete. To avoid creating confusion 
about all this, Poythress ought to define theory 
completeness and carefully distinguish it from de-
ductive completeness before proceeding to expli-
cate Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems.
It should be clear from the above analysis that, 
at least in its technical particulars, Logic falls short 
 Since Poythress insists on 
developing modern logic in the 
style of Whitehead and Russell, 
as an axiomatic system, he has 
the possibility of examining PL 
and FOL from both points of 
view, but he fails to do either 
satisfactorily.
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of establishing an alternative foundation for trans-
forming Western thought; it is not even a fully ade-
quate exposition of elementary logic. Components 
essential to an introductory logic text (valid argu-
ments, derivation) are missing or underdeveloped 
or artificial, and some important notions (implica-
tion, completeness) are wrong or confused. I think 
these problems may arise in large part because of 
what Poythress relies upon as his main resource for 
defining and treating logic—Whitehead and Rus-
sell’s Principia Mathematica (1910-1913). That’s 
a work that treats logic as an axiomatic theory of 
logical truths and that sees logical implication as 
captured by conditional statements. But given that 
Poythress wants to reject pagan and secular phi-
losophy with its attendant dependence on the au-
tonomy of logic and rationality, it’s not clear to me 
why he would so strongly endorse their approach 
to logic. Russell is a well-known atheist whose pas-
sion was to create an absolutely certain foundation 
for all of mathematics by reducing it to logic. Since 
idolizing logic in this reductionistic way is diamet-
rically opposed to the sort of foundation Poythress 
hopes to achieve, I expected him to distrust their 
logicist development of logic, but he seems on the 
contrary to admire it greatly (cf. 309 and 343-4).
A more modest aim regarding the role of logic 
would lead one to conceptualize and systematize 
logic differently. For instance, rather than tak-
ing logic to be the grand theoretical foundation 
for mathematics, a view that seems to require a 
Russell-style axiomatic approach, one can view 
logic as formulating the laws for valid and con-
clusive reasoning as it actually occurs in everyday 
life and in all rational disciplines. This aim is best 
met by adopting a more genuine natural-deduc-
tion approach to logic, an alternative that was first 
developed by Jaskowski around 1930, promoted 
by Fitch in 1952, and has now been adopted in 
some version by many logic texts. Organizing 
logic around the idea of capturing the deductive 
ways we ordinarily and correctly reason, one can 
give more balanced attention to the various com-
ponents of logic as well as a better explication of 
the key meta-logical properties of soundness and 
completeness.
Theological Foundations
Having analyzed various methodological aspects 
of Logic in some detail, I will now turn to examine 
the theological basis Poythress has constructed for 
the field of logic. This is the part of the book that is 
most original with Poythress and on which he pins 
his hopes of providing something truly alternative. 
Since this is not my area of professional expertise, 
I will merely summarize his main points, make a 
few remarks, and raise some questions for further 
reflection. As Poythress discusses these matters at 
length throughout the book, more can certainly be 
said about this than I will do here.
Poythress notes in numerous places that he is 
setting out a theistic foundation for logic, in all its 
parts and aspects (cf. Chapters 26, 47, 49, 57, 59, 
61, and 66). But this is too generic a description 
of his goal. Poythress wants to create a Christian 
theological foundation for logic in order to purify 
and transform the pagan and secular ways it has 
been pursued throughout the history of Western 
thought. For him this means relating logical ideas 
and procedures to the Trinitarian God of the Old 
and New Testaments. Which he does in great de-
tail: his Scripture Index of cited texts runs to almost 
five pages, four columns each.
Poythress draws upon the Bible in several ways. 
There is first of all his use of Scripture passages to 
illustrate various forms of valid argumentation, 
something found in few other logic texts. But 
because these often involve statements that talk 
about Jesus Christ, God the Father, and the Holy 
Spirit, they also function as opportunities for him 
to expound on various attributes of God and point 
out relations holding among the three persons of 
the Trinity.
Since, according to Poythress, God is the Orig-
inal while creatures, their properties, relations, 
and activities are all reflections of the Original, 
the more deeply we understand the nature of God 
from Scripture, the better we’ll understand the 
true character of logic (cf. Chapters 7 and 11 – 
13). God is constant, dependable, faithful to his 
nature, and self-consistent; human logic reflects 
this consistency. God is eternal and omnipresent; 
valid human arguments hold (insofar as is pos-
sible) everywhere and at all times, independent of 
when and where they are made. God is omnipo-
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tent, absolute, and immutable; the laws of logic are 
constant, abiding, unchangeable, and necessary. 
God is truthful; the laws of logic are infallibly true 
and cannot be annulled.
I don’t find the pervasive use of analogies to be 
a terribly persuasive way to argue for God being 
intrinsically related to logic. On the other hand, 
I’m certainly not opposed to making connections 
between the Creator and the creation (including 
logic), though I would mostly want to turn them 
around, adopting what might be termed a gener-
alized incarnational approach. Our experiential 
knowledge of how the creation is structured and 
operates helps us to better understand the One 
who made it, also because, as Scripture indicates, 
the Creator has chosen to reveal himself to us by 
taking on certain features of his creation. Wheth-
er or not these are part of the essential nature of 
God, I’m unwilling to speculate about; I think this 
view transcends what we can rightly infer from 
Scripture and creation. We can know something 
of God’s faithfulness to his creation from logical 
consistency, which follows from what might be 
called the harmonious agreement of reality; we 
can understand how God’s sovereignty over cre-
ation functions within the realm of argumentation 
by seeing that valid reasoning must satisfy certain 
criteria for soundness, that certain principles are 
used in constructing conclusive arguments, and so 
on. The structure and richness and beauty and ap-
plicability of logic reveal in some small measure 
God’s greatness and loving care for his creation, as 
do other aspects of human life and the wide world 
around us. But I don’t think a Christian founda-
tion for logic (or mathematics or any other crea-
turely reality) is properly laid by focusing on the 
being and character of God.
Poythress criticizes Western logic for severing 
all connections to God. While mainline thinkers 
may still recognize various salient features of logic, 
they refuse to ground them in God’s nature, taking 
logic and rationality as autonomous. In particular, 
Poythress judges that pagan and secular thinkers 
exhibit their sinful rebellion against God by mak-
ing logic impersonal, formal, and mechanical (cf. 
Chapters 8 and 22). He admits that logic does 
indeed have a sort of independence from humans 
and from specific meanings, but he says that when 
logic is made overly precise and formal, it is no 
longer related to a personal God. His alternative is 
to conceive of logic as personal. God is a person, 
so logic must be personal, too. I have difficulty 
grasping the exact meaning and full significance 
of Poythress’s claim here, and I fail to see how de-
veloping a formal system of logic, seeing logic as 
applying to argumentation whatever the informa-
tion content, promotes atheism. Certainly some 
Western thinkers asserted human autonomy from 
God and human mastery over the world by idola-
trously elevating Reason over against divine Rev-
elation, thus denying the biblical notion of God as 
sovereign Creator, but I don’t see this as cause for 
rejecting the development of logic into formal sys-
tems for evaluating and constructing arguments. 
As noted above, I would find this anti-Christian 
trend instead a strong incentive for rejecting Rus-
sell’s logicistic approach to logic and mathemat-
ics, but here Poythress seems hesitant to pull the 
trigger.
Besides emphasizing the personal nature of 
God, Poythress wants to ground logic in the mys-
tery of the Trinity. He does this in a number of 
ways, treating them as providing different theo-
logical perspectives on the nature of logic (cf. 
Chapters 8, 9, 11, and Appendix F5). Here, too, 
I don’t fully understand the import of his analo-
gies. For instance, he says that God the Father 
created according to a certain plan in harmony 
with divine self-consistency (this corresponds to 
logical consistency), God the Son speaks reality 
into existence as the divine Word (corresponding 
to the articulation of logical laws), and God the 
Spirit holds creatures responsible to the plan for 
Poythress wants to create 
a Christian theological 
foundation for logic in order to 
purify and transform the pagan 
and secular ways it has been 
pursued throughout the history 
of Western thought.
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their existence (thus, particular arguments cannot 
violate the laws of logic but instantiate them). Or, 
since logic depends upon language, the Trinitarian 
character of language contributes as well to a Trini-
tarian foundation for logic. Symbolic logic has a 
referential component for the meaning of its words 
and sentences, a grammatical component for prop-
erly combining words into sentences, and a syntac-
tic component for writing or expressing words and 
sentences. According to Poythress, this is all based 
in the nature of the Trinity: meaning connects to 
God the Father, grammar to God the Son, and 
speech or expression to God the Spirit. If one were 
to query why this particular assignment, Poythress 
would likely appeal to the fact that God is one and 
that each person of the Godhead exhibits all the 
features of divine speech and logic in some respect.
These parallels may strike the reader as loose 
or far-fetched, but Poythress makes an even stron-
ger claim about the intrinsic connection between 
logic and God. Based on John 1:1, which identi-
fies Jesus as the Divine Word (Logos) made flesh, 
and on Genesis 1, where God speaks to create or-
der from chaos, Poythress concludes, “This eternal 
Word is the eternal speech of God. He is therefore 
also the eternal logic or reason of God. … Now it 
becomes more evident why [logic] is personal. It is 
not only personal, but a person, namely, the Word 
of God” (71). Of course, Jesus is acknowledged to 
be more than divine logic, and all persons of the 
Trinity are deemed logical by virtue of their being 
self-consistent, but divine logic resides principal-
ly in the second person of the Trinity. This truth 
about logic stands behind all human logic, which 
is but a dim reflection of eternal logic: “Logic as 
we human beings experience it has roots in eternal 
logic, namely, the eternal Word, the second person 
of the Trinity, in fellowship with the Father and 
the Spirit” (86).
Having condemned Western thinkers for mak-
ing logic autonomous, an autonomy that gives 
it a divine character usurping the place of God, 
Poythress recognizes the need to guard against a 
similar accusation of his own position. He admits 
that on his account “the laws of logic … look sus-
piciously like the biblical idea of God” (68). So 
the question naturally arises, “By claiming that the 
laws of logic have divine attributes, are we divin-
izing nature? That is, are we taking something out 
of the created world, and falsely claiming that it is 
divine? Is logic part of the created world? Should 
we not classify it as creature rather than Creator?” 
(69). Those seem like excellent questions to me. 
His answer is that “logic seems to be independent 
of the world. We cannot imagine a world in which 
logic does not hold. This fact shows that we are 
confronted with a transcendent reality. … [Thus] 
logic as it really is … is an aspect of the mind of 
God” (69). God himself is not subject to logic, 
but His logic is no less divine, transcending cre-
ated reality, because it is embodied in the second 
person of the Trinity. Poythress believes that this 
position doesn’t divinize logic or abrogate God’s 
transcendence over his creation because our imma-
nent creaturely logic merely reflects God’s original 
eternal logic. I don’t find his response to the ques-
tions he posed very satisfying, though. It seems to 
trade upon fluctuating notions of “independence” 
and “transcendence,” not to mention “logic.” One 
man’s analogy borders on another man’s equivoca-
tion, I suppose.
Frankly, all the theological speculation about 
logic’s divine attributes—how logic must be an as-
pect of God’s nature, how it resides in the mind 
of God, and why it is personified as one of the 
persons of the Trinity—is enough to make the lay 
reader a little dazed and perplexed. How can such 
religious mysteries function analogically as a co-
herent theoretical or ontic foundation for logic? 
Without knowing what God’s transcendent logic 
is, how can we tell whether our human logic is a 
faithful reflection of it? Where can we get trustwor-
thy information about divine logic, from Scrip-
tural discourse? Are tautologies such as the Law 
of Excluded Middle essential parts of God’s nature? 
Could God have made the laws of logic different 
from what we experience them to be? Does God 
make paradigm valid arguments that we should 
emulate? Does God create elegant derivations of 
tautologies from axiomatic truths via Modus Po-
nens and Substitution? Does God have a favorite 
privileged set of natural deduction inference rules? 
Perhaps we need to press Poythress to provide an 
explicit and cogent definition of logic so that we 
can better assess just what all this mystical musing 
comes to. It certainly seems pious to locate logic in 
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the mind of God, to see an eternal version of logic 
as embodied in the second person of the Trinity, 
but I do not know why or that this is the case, nor, 
if it were true, what difference it would make in 
the organization and interpretation and applica-
tion of logic, beyond providing a theological gloss.
Concluding Assessment
In the end, one might ask what this textbook does 
for Christian students who desire to learn elemen-
tary logic, positioning this knowledge within a 
broader Christian view of God’s world.
Readers will certainly learn a number of stan-
dard things about classical systems of logic—what 
some basic syllogistic forms are and how to use 
Venn Diagrams to evaluate them, how to con-
struct truth tables and use them to define truth 
functional connectives, how quantifiers and re-
lations enter into deductive arguments, etc.—
and they will be introduced to (a certain way of 
making) derivations and to various foundational 
linkages between logic and mathematics; but as I 
have indicated above, some significant parts of the 
logical presentation are incomplete, ill-conceived, 
outdated, and even confused. The technical side of 
this work would no doubt have been improved by 
employing a knowledgeable editor or by submit-
ting an early draft of the text for review to people 
who teach introductory logic.
In addition, students who use this book will 
be exposed to an extensive presentation of Corne-
lius Van Til’s Trinitarian and analogical theology, 
developed specially for logic by Poythress. Some 
may consider this the genius of the work. Others, 
however, if they manage to make it all the way 
through the book, may find this aspect somewhat 
tiresome, wishing the logic would be more simply 
presented without overwhelming it at every stage 
with theological ruminations. While I appreciate 
seeing Poythress’s viewpoint worked out, I am nev-
ertheless sympathetic to this latter sentiment: less 
would have been more.
Personally, I don’t find that an analogical theo-
logical approach generates a very helpful Chris-
tian viewpoint on logic. I don’t think one should 
locate logic (any variety) in the mind of God or 
identify it with Jesus Christ. One need not make 
connections to God’s nature and character in or-
der to place logic in proper Christian perspective. 
Like other scientific endeavors, logic studies an 
important aspect of God’s creation, attempting to 
determine and formulate the laws that hold for the 
part of the cosmos where logical consequences and 
deductive arguments are prevalent. Logic can be 
used to illuminate and enrich certain parts of hu-
man experience and various rational activities, so 
we are called to unfold this part of the creation. Its 
scope, however, is limited. Here I fully agree with 
Poythress: absolutizing logic and deductive ratio-
nality is an intellectual form of idolatry. But that 
very tendency also makes me refuse to locate logic 
within the divine character and being of God. 
There we may have to differ profoundly.
Frankly, all the theological 
speculation about logic’s divine 
attributes—how logic must be 
an aspect of God’s nature, how 
it resides in the mind of God, 
and why it is personified as one 
of the persons of the Trinity—is 
enough to make the lay reader 
a little dazed and perplexed.
